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I use the monetary version of the neoclassical growth model developed by Aruoba,
Waller and Wright (2008) to study the properties of the model when there is exogenous
growth. I ￿rst consider the planner￿ s problem, then the equilibrium outcome in a mon-
etary economy. I do so by ￿rst using proportional bargaining to determine the terms
of trade and then consider competitive price taking. I obtain closed form solutions
for the balanced growth path of all variables in all cases. I then derive closed form
solutions for the transition paths under the assumption of full depreciation and, in the
monetary economy, a non-stationary interest rate policy.
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11 Introduction
The e⁄ect of in￿ ation on economic growth is a classic issue in monetary economics. Early
contributions by Tobin (1965) and Sidrauski (1967a,1967b) gave us insights as to how in￿ a-
tion could deter (or stimulate) economic growth. The RBC literature revived the neoclassical
growth model and made it the workhorse of modern macroeconomics. This gave rise to a re-
newed interest in studying the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on growth with notable work being done by
Cooley and Hansen (1989), Gomme (1993) and Ireland (1994). In all of these models, money
is ￿ forced￿into the neoclassical growth model, via the assumption of cash-in-advance. Thus,
while the real side of these models has well-understood microfoundations, the monetary side
does not.
During this same time period, tremendous progress was made understanding the micro-
foundations of money. Starting with the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993),
search theoretic models of money provided deep insights on the role of money as a medium
of exchange. These models aided us in understanding how the value of money is a⁄ected by
information frictions, matching frictions and pricing protocols such as bargaining ￿features
that are absent from the standard neoclassical growth model. As a result, substantial work
has been done trying to integrate modern monetary theory with mainstream macroeconomics
so we would have a better understanding of how in￿ ation a⁄ects capital accumulation and
growth. Research along these lines has been done by Shi (1999), Aruoba and Wright (2003),
Menner (2006) Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2008), Aruoba and Chugh (2008) and Berentsen,
Rojas-Breu and Shi (2009).
My objective here is to contribute to this growing literature. I do so by providing ana-
lytical results on steady-state growth and transitional dynamics in the Aruoba, Waller and
Wright (AWW) model of money and capital. Whereas AWW focuses mainly on the quan-
titative aspects of in￿ ation on capital accumulation and growth, in this paper I focus on
analytical properties of the model.
The AWW framework combines a monetary search sector with the neoclassical growth
model. However, the AWW paper does not have growth nor does it address the conditions
needed for balanced growth. Thus, in this paper, I add exogenous labor enhancing technolog-
ical change to the AWW model and determine the necessary conditions for balanced growth.
I then obtain closed form analytical solutions for the steady state capital to labor ratio for:
1) the planner allocation, 2) the monetary equilibrium with proportional bargaining and 3)
the monetary equilibrium with price taking. I then study the transition dynamics of the
model under the assumption of full depreciation of capital. For the planner allocation, the
saving rate is constant, the capital-labor ratio converges monotonically to its steady state
2value and hours are constant along the transition path. For the monetary economy, given a
constant interest rate policy, this is not the case ￿hours vary along the transition path which
makes the saving rate vary as well. I then consider a particular non-stationary policy for
the nominal interest rate. Under this policy, the nominal interest adjusts to the growth rate
of real wages ￿if wage growth is excessively high, the nominal interest is below its steady
state value. This policy keeps hours worked constant and equal to its steady-state value
along the transition path. This is consistent with the planner￿ s desired behavior for hours
along the transition path. With this policy, I am able to obtain closed form solutions for the
transition paths under both pricing mechanisms. These solutions involve a constant saving
rate, constant hours along the transition path and monotone convergence of the capital-labor
ratio to its steady state value.
2 Environment
The environment is essentially that of AWW. A [0;1] continuum of agents live forever in
discrete time. Following LW, trade occurs in two separate subperiods. In the ￿rst subperiod
trade occurs in a decentralized fashion, DM for short, while in subperiod 2, trade occurs
in a perfect competitive centralized market, denoted the CM. In the DM, there is a double
coincidence problem and private trading histories are private information, i.e., agents are
anonymous.
As in AWW, there are two assets available to households, capital and money. Capital is
assumed to be non-portable in the DM so buyers must search for sellers. So capital cannot
be used as a medium of exchange and claims to such capital can be costlessly counterfeited
just as IOU￿ s can be counterfeited. Thus, money has a role even when capital is a storable
factor of production.
In the CM there is a general good produced using labor H and capital K that can be
used for consumption or investment. Production occurs according to the aggregate produc-
tion function where Yt = F(Kt;ZtHt) where F is the technology and Zt is a labor/e⁄ort
augmenting technology factor that evolves according to the process Zt = (1 + ￿)Zt￿1. We
also have Yt=Zt = F(Kt=Zt;Ht). Capital is assumed to depreciate at rate 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
In the DM, each period with probability ￿ an agent can consume but not produce, while
with the symmetric probablity he can produce but not consume. With probability 1￿2￿ he
is a nontrader ￿he neither produces nor consumes and gets a utility payo⁄ of zero. Due to
symmetry in the measure of buyers and sellers, I assume that there is a matching technology
that randomly assigns one buyer to one seller. Sellers in the DM can produce output qt using
their own e⁄ort e and capital k using a the CRTS technology f(kt;Ztet). Sellers produce
3where their capital is located so they have access to their capital, even though buyers do
not. We then have qt=Zt = f(kt=Zt;et).
Instantaneous utility for everyone in the CM is U(x) ￿ Ah, where x is consumption
and h labor. Preferences are separable in consumption and leisure. In the DM, with
probability ￿ you are a buyer and enjoy utility u(q), and with probability ￿ you are a
seller and get disutility ‘(e), where q is consumption and e labor. The utility functions
u and U have the usual monotonicity and curvature properties and u(0) = 0. Solving
qt=Zt = f(ktZt;et) for et = f￿1(qt=Zt;kt=Zt), we get the utility cost of producing q given k ￿
‘(e) = ‘[f￿1(qt=Zt;kt=Zt)] ￿ c(qt=Zt;kt=Zt). Monotonicity and convexity imply this latter
function has the properties cq;cqq > 0, ck < 0 and ckk > 0, and cqk < 0 since fkfee < fefek
holds when k is a normal input. Agents discount across periods at rate ￿ = (1 + ￿)
￿1 where
￿ is the time rate of discount.
The money stock is given by Mt and evolves according to the process Mt = ￿Mt￿1. Agents
receive a lump-sum transfer of cash, ￿M, in the CM. In an earlier version of the paper, I
included exogenously determined government spending and taxes; they are excluded here to
minimize clutter and focus on how trading frictions and bargaining a⁄ect the steady-state
allocation and dynamics. For notational simplicity, period t + 1 is denoted +1; and so.
Agents discount between the CM and DM at rate ￿ but not between the DM and CM.
3 Planner Allocation
Consider the planner￿ s problem in this economy where agents are treated symmetrically and












+ U(X) ￿ AH + ￿J(K+1)
￿
(1)
s:t: X = F(K;ZH) + (1 ￿ ￿)K ￿ K+1
Eliminating X and di⁄erentiating, the ￿rst order conditions are







H : A = U0(X)FH(K;ZH)Z
K+1 : U0(X) = ￿J0(K+1)
(2)
















































X = ZF(K=Z;H) + (1 ￿ ￿)K ￿ K+1 (7)
Two comments are in order. First, if ￿ = 0; then q = 0 and the model collapses to the
standard neoclassical growth model. Second, if capital is not productive in the DM, then
the model dichotomizes as in Aruoba and Wright (2003) ￿the steady evolution of K;X;H
and Y can be determined independently using (5)-(7) while (4) detemines q=Z.
Consider the following functional forms:
F(K;ZH) = K
￿ (ZH)































































Note that without bargaining, we do not need u(q) to go through the origin which occurs
when b > 0: So set b = 0 and use u(q) =
q1￿￿￿1
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#


























Conjecture a steady state with balanced growth and constant aggregate hours H+1 = H for
all t. This implies we have a constant value of capital per e¢ ciency labor unit, ^ K = K=ZH,
and all real variables grow at the rate 1 + ￿.





1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ^ K1￿￿Z
1="
where K > 0 if [1=(￿ + ￿)]
1
1￿￿ > ^ K. This implies that K grows at gross rate (1 + ￿)
1=". With
constant hours and Z growing at rate 1 + ￿ we need " = 1 or log utility in the CM. This is
standard in the neoclassical growth model when preferences are separable over consumption
and leisure. So impose this. Steady-state hours and consumption are then giving by
H =
(1 ￿ ￿)BA￿1
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ^ K1￿￿
X = (1 ￿ ￿)BA
￿1 ^ K
￿Z











































The growth rate of q equals 1+￿ when ￿ = 1 which also makes q+1=K+1 constant in steady
state. Hence, we need log preferences in the DM to have balanced growth in DM production.
Impose this from here on. Note that dq=d ^ K > 0.




















































So we have a balanced growth path with K;X and q all growing at gross rate 1 + ￿. For
￿ > 0 and   > 1, capital has additional value for producing in the DM so the steady-state
capital per e¢ ciency unit of labor is higher than in the standard neoclassical growth model.
Steady state hours worked in the CM are also higher.
3.2 Dynamics






































Conjecture that hours are constant for all t along the transition path. Combining (15)











With full depreciation, the planner keeps hours at the steady state value. For ￿ > 0 and
  > 1; hours are higher along the transition path than in the standard neoclassical growth
7model. It also implies that investment (CM consumption) is a higher (lower) fraction of

















































If ￿ = 0 then we have the standard transition path for capital in the Solow model . Thus,
the additional productivity of capital in the DM not only generates a higher steady-state
capital stock per e¢ ciency unit of labor, but also a higher rate of investment and more rapid
growth in the transition to the steady-state.
4 Monetary Economy
In the monetary economy, ￿rms hire labor and capital to produce output which is sold in
the CM at the monetary price p. Goods and input markets are perfectly competitive. Pro￿t
maximization implies rt = FK(Kt=Zt;Ht) and wt = F(Kt=Zt;Ht)Zt, where r is the rental
rate, and w is the real wage. Constant returns implies equilibrium pro￿ts are 0. Firms do
not operate in the DM but agents can use their capital and e⁄ort to produce output.
Let W(m;k;Z) and V (m;k;Z) be the value functions of agents in the CM and DM
respectively when holding m units of money, k units of capital given the aggregate state Z.
Begining with the CM, we have
W(m;k;Z) = max
x;h;m+1;k+1
fU(x) ￿ Ah + ￿V (m+1;k+1;Z+1)g























A(1 + r ￿ ￿)
w
: (19)
In the DM market, we have
V (m;k;Z) = ￿Vb(m;k;Z) + ￿Vs(m;k;Z) + (1 ￿ 2￿)W(m;k;Z) (20)
with









+ W (m + ds;k;Z); (22)
where qb and db are the quantities of goods acquired and money spent by buyers in the DM,
while qs and ds are the quantities of goods produced and money earned by sellers.
Using (18), we have








































































A(1 + r ￿ ￿)
w
:
In order to solve (17), we must evaluate these derivatives. To do that we need to describe
9how the terms of trade are determined in the DM. One possibility is pricing taking. Another
is bargaining.
4.1 Proportional Bargaining
Suppose agents are randomly matched in a bilateral fashion in the D with each buyer be-
ing randomly paired with a seller. In the search theoretic models of money, bargaining has
traditionally been used to determine the terms of trade in bilateral trades, with Nash bar-
gaining being the standard. However, as Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007) emphasize,
in the LW framework, Nash bargaining generates non-monotonic surpluses for buyers. Thus
ine¢ ciencies occurring under the Friedman rule are due to this property of the bargaining
solution rather than a holdup problem as suggested by LW.
To avoid this problem, I will consider proportional bargaining as the way in which terms
of trade are determined. Under proportional bargaining, the buyer￿ s gains from trade is a















Imposing d = m we have
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(1 ￿ ￿)u0 (q)
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(1 ￿ ￿)u0 (q+1)









X = F(K;ZH) + (1 ￿ ￿)K ￿ K+1: (26)
4.1.1 Steady State
Along the balanced growth path, hours are constant and X; K+1 and q grow at a rate 1+￿.
Conjecture that real balances M=p also grow at the rate 1 + ￿ implying
1 + ￿ = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿):
It then follows that the nominal interest satis￿es
1 + i = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿).
Using the functional forms above, conjecture there is a constant value of ^ K = K=ZH along
the balanced growth path. Then (23) and (26) yield
X = (1 ￿ ￿)BA
￿1 ^ K
￿Z









1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ^ K1￿￿:























11Note that if i = 0; then for any 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 we have
u










which is the e¢ cient quantity given the current capital stock K+1. This is consistent with
the results in Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007) ￿under the Friedman rule, proportional
bargaining generates the e¢ cient quantity of goods traded in the DM even though buyers
do not get the entire trade surplus. In short, there is no holdup problem on buyers at the
Friedman rule. Note, even though q+1 is e¢ cient, it is not equal to the planner￿ s choice of
q+1 unless K+1 is the same as the planner choice. As we show below, this is not the case due
to the hold-up problem on capital discussed in AWW.
Solving for q+1 yields
q+1 =
￿





(1 ￿ ￿)B ^ KA￿1












For a given value of ￿; q+1 = 0 at a ￿nite in￿ ation rate. In short the monetary equilibrium
collapses. In what follows, I assume this condition holds.













1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)
























1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿)￿￿
^ qb ￿
￿





(1 ￿ ￿)BA￿1 ^ Kb





Note that even if the FR holds i = 0, we do not replicate the planner allocation since
1￿￿ ￿ 1: The reason is that 1￿￿ appears in front of the second term of the numerator and
denominator on the RHS. This is capturing the holdup problem on capital. Thus, while the
FR eliminates the holdup problem on money, there is still a holdup problem on capital.
124.1.2 Dynamics



































































These two equations can be combined to obtain a non-linear equation for H+1 as a function
of H and ^ K.
As with price taking consider a non-stationary interest rate policy given by
1 + i =





where ￿ is a constant and satis￿es ￿￿ ￿ ￿. When wages grow at the balanced path growth
rate, we have i = ￿￿￿￿
1￿￿ ￿ 0 with the Friedman rule corresponding to ￿￿ = ￿. As I will show
shortly, this policy has the e⁄ect of keeping hours worked in the CM constant along the
transition path, just as the planner would choose. One way of thinking about this policy is
that it aims at employment stability.



















































































Under this policy the transition path for ^ K+1 is monotone. Note that even at the Fried-
man rule ￿ = ￿￿ the transition paths do not mimic the planner allocation due to the hold-up
problem on capital. Thus, the holdup problem on capital leads to a lower steady state ^ K;
lower investment along the transition path and thus a lower growth rate of the economy for
^ K < ^ Kb.
4.2 Price taking
As shown in AWW, price taking eliminates the holdup problems on both buyers and sellers.
This leaves the time cost of holding money as the only remaining friction. In this section,
I consider price taking in order to see how the model behaves in the absence of holdup
problems. Assume that agents trade anonymously in a competitive market in the DM and
take the market price ~ p parametrically. The buyer￿ s problem is
Vb(m;k;Z) = max
qb;d
u(qb) + W(m ￿ d;k;Z)
s.t. ~ pqb = d and d ￿ m











+ W [m + ~ pq;k;Z]:
It is easy to show that the buyer￿ s constraint d ￿ m is binding in equilibrium, and so



























































































X + K+1 = F(K;ZH) + (1 ￿ ￿)K: (30)
A monetary equilibrium is a sequence of quantities fX;K+1;H;qg solving (27)-(30) given an
initial capital stock K0 and money stock M0:
4.2.1 Steady state
Along the balanced growth path, hours are constant and X; K+1 and q grow at a rate 1+￿.
Conjecture that real balances M=p also grow at the rate 1 + ￿ implying
1 + ￿ = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿):
It then follows that the nominal interest satis￿es
1 + i = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿).
As with the planner, (28) and (30) yield




(1 ￿ ￿)BA￿1 ^ K
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ^ K1￿￿Z (32)
H =
(1 ￿ ￿)BA￿1
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ^ K1￿￿ (33)























So i = 0 generates the e¢ cient quantity of goods in the DM. All that remains to determine










(1 ￿ ￿)BA￿1 ^ K




Using this expression as well as (29) in the Euler equation we obtain the equilibrium values







































1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿)￿￿
3
5:
Compared to the planner allocation (12) and (13) we have ^ Km < ^ Kp and Hm < Hp for




(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)
￿ 1:
So at the Friedman rule, de￿ ation must be greater than the time rate of discount ￿it must












(1 ￿ ￿)BA￿1 ^ Km
1 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ^ K1￿￿
m
# ￿1
Since ^ Km = ^ Kp at i = 0; we have ^ qm = ^ qp at the Friedman rule. Intuitively, in￿ ation acts as
a tax on DM consumption which reduces the equilibrium value of q: This in turn lowers the
marginal value of capital and agents accumulate less capital and work fewer hours.
164.2.2 Dynamics


























Combining these two equations gives us a non-linear dynamic equation in H+1 in term
of H and ^ K￿. So the dynamical system
[AH ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)B]
￿
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determines the paths of H+1 and ^ K+1 as a function of current H and ^ K.
Consider a non-stationary monetary policy along the transition path. One such policy is
^ K￿
+1
^ K￿ (1 + i) ￿ 1 + ￿ = ￿
where ￿ ￿ ￿ is some constant. It then follows that current interest rates satisfy





Manipulate this expression to write it in terms of real wages




If real wages converge to the balanced growth rate, then this policy rule converges to the
value i = ￿ ￿ ￿. If ￿ = ￿, this policy rule generates the Friedman rule along the balanced
growth path. As shown above, such a policy keeps hours constant along the transition path,
just as the planner would choose.














































Under this policy rule, the transition path for ^ K is monotone. It mimics the planner￿ s
transition path but at a slower growth rate when ￿ > ￿. What does this policy do? It
adjusts the interest rate such that the cost of acquiring money in t and t+1, i.e., the growth
rate of real wages, is una⁄ected by the transition to the steady state. If real wages are going
to grow unusually fast, then it is cheaper to acquire a unit of money in t + 1 than acquire
a unit of money in t and carry it to t + 1. Hence the demand for money would fall along
with its real value. To counter this, the policy above lowers i to improve the value of money






















The RHS is the marginal liquidity value of money. The LHS is the marginal cost of holding
money from t to t + 1: Under the proposed policy, the LHS is constant. Thus, q+1 adjusts
to equate the marginal liquidity value to this constant cost of holding money along the
transition path.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our analytical understanding of the role of matching frictions,
bargaining and money on growth dynamics. Whereas AWW focus on numerical analysis, I
am able to derive analytical results that provide additional insight for the numerical results
obtained in AWW. The bene￿t of this analysis is that it provides clear and simple intuition
for how bargaining, random matching and changes in the nominal interest rate a⁄ect the
steady state-capital labor ratio, consumption and short-run growth rates of the economy.
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